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Abstract
We present a theory that addresses the question of why autocracies with a regime legitimation which ties 
the destiny of the members of the ruling elite, namely the nobility or ideocratic elite, to the survival of the 
autocracy, namely (ruling) monarchies and communist ideocracies, are more durable than other kinds of 
autocracies. Using logistic regression analysis and event history analysis on a dataset on autocratic regimes in 
the period 1946 to 2009, we are able to show that ruling monarchies and communist ideocracies are indeed 
the most durable autocratic regime types.
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Introduction
The recent wave of autocracy research focuses primarily on the stabilizing effect of institutions for 
autocracies such as cooptation mechanisms (Brownlee, 2007; Blaydes, 2011; Cox, 2009; Gandhi, 
2008; Gandhi and Lust-Okar, 2009; Gandhi and Przeworski, 2007; Magaloni and Kricheli, 2010; 
Schedler, 2009; Svolik, 2012). For example, researchers claim that autocracies with a legislature 
are more durable because they use this institution as a forum for policy concessions (Gandhi and 
Przeworski, 2007) and/or as a forum to distribute patronage and other spoils (Lust-Okar, 2009). 
Geddes (1999: 130–138) argues, in a game theoretical model, that competing factions of ruling 
parties are always better off together and, hence, one-party autocracies are more durable than mili-
tary and personalist autocracies. Geddes names cooptation as the decisive causal mechanism.
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However, reliance on cooptation, understood as the ‘intentional extension of benefits to chal-
lengers to the regime in exchange for their loyalty’ (Frantz and Kendall-Taylor, 2014: 2), entails a 
practical hazard. If the ruling elite distributes spoils to its potential challengers, the material bene-
fits might empower them to act against the regime. To rely on repression also involves a practical 
hazard: ‘the very resources that enable a regime’s repressive agents to suppress its opposition also 
empower it to act against the regime itself’ (Svolik, 2012: 10). It is therefore likely that autocracies 
that rely on cooptation and repression alone are – at least during times of crisis – in a ‘relatively 
unstable situation’ (Weber, 1978: 213; see also Easton, 1965a: 124; Easton, 1965b: 278).
While we agree that cooptation and repression are important tools in the toolbox of autocrats – 
especially in times of crises – we emphasize the regime’s legitimation as the most important mech-
anism for survival (Backes and Kailitz, 2015; Kailitz, 2013). Even non-democratic regimes need 
to legitimate their authority vis à vis the ruling elite and the masses of ordinary citizens (Ulfelder, 
2005). The ruling elite’s own sense of legitimacy is of particular importance (Rothschild, 1977). It 
is crucial for any autocratic regime that at least the great majority of the regime’s elite has the 
desire for the regime to survive (Brownlee, 2007; Geddes, 1999; Levitsky and Way, 2012; Svolik, 
2009). There are different possible objects of political legitimation – the nation, the state, the 
regime, the rulers, and specific policies. We focus here on regime legitimation (Pakulski 1993: 69), 
which we define as a ‘political formula’, that is able – if well-designed –to play both ‘a unifying 
and [a] self-legitimizing role’ (Pakulski, 1993: 77) for the political elite. A strong claim to legiti-
macy enhances considerably the unity of the elite (Barker, 2001; Grauvogel and Von Soest, 2014; 
Kailitz, 2013); it minimizes uncertainty among the members of the ruling elite about their future 
and/or maximizes their regime support (Higley and Lengyel, 2000; Higley and Pakulski, 2000).
According to our theory, autocracies are durable if the regime legitimation as a ‘political for-
mula’ of the regime defines a narrow ruling elite that is strongly tied to the fate of the regime. The 
desire of the ruling elite in such regimes to maintain the status quo does not necessarily rest on an 
actual normative belief in the regime’s legitimacy, but could be based on rational calculations by 
its members (i.e. members of the ruling elite are aware that they might be worse off when the 
regime changes). In particular, during times of crises, such a ‘political formula’ can serve as ‘a 
basis for elite re-unification and coercive measures’ (Pakulski, 1993: 77). To test our theory we use 
a polythetic classification of regime types (Bailey, 1973a; Bailey, 1973b) which places the regime’s 
justification of power at its center (Kailitz, 2013). We use various autocratic regime types (i.e. mili-
tary autocracy, communist ideocracy, electoral autocracy, (ruling) monarchy, personalist autocracy, 
one party autocracy) as simple proxies to measure differences in patterns of regime legitimation.1
The article is structured as follows. First, we present our classification of autocratic regime types 
(Kailitz, 2013; Kailitz, 2015). Second, we outline our theory and present hypotheses on how claims 
of legitimacy of these autocratic regime types affect elite unity and hence the durability of these 
regime types. Third, we discuss the methodological procedures adopted for this research. To answer 
our research question, we employ a two-step research strategy, using descriptive statistics and dis-
crete time survival modeling on global cross-country data from the period 1946 to 2009. Our means’ 
test and our regression models, in which we control for economic wealth, economic growth, resource 
dependency, ethnic fractionalization, cooptation and repression, indicate that ruling monarchies and 
communist ideocracies endure the longest. Finally, we summarize the main findings of this research 
and suggest avenues for future research. 2
Classification of political regimes
We use Kailitz’ (2013) typology and distinguish between (ruling) monarchy, ideocracy, military 
autocracy, (non-monarchic) personalist autocracy, (non-ideocratic) one-party autocracy, 
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and electoral autocracy.3 These regime ‘clusters’ (6 and Bellamy, 2012: 149), with their multiple 
attributes, are deeply rooted in the qualitative literature on political regimes and, except for the 
ideocratic regime type (Backes and Kailitz, 2015), are also labeled as such.4 Because some concep-
tual ‘overlap’ between various regime ‘clusters’ may exist, we used a list of sequential coding rules 
that allowed us to assign a country to a specific category. The first step in categorizing autocracies 
is to sort out all non-regime phases such as civil war or the occupation of a country; the second step 
in categorizing autocracies is to verify who actually rules an autocratic country.
Following the proposed sequence of our coding rules, the vast majority of empirical cases can 
be classified unambiguously to one regime category. A regime is coded as a (ruling) monarchy if 
the ruler has a monarchic title such as ‘King’ or ‘Emir’. This simple criterion excludes all regimes, 
as non-monarchies, in which a former king – such as Mohammed Dhaud in Afghanistan or Mutesa 
in Uganda – rules as a non-monarchic elected ruler. Parliamentary monarchies, in which the mon-
arch does not rule, as in today’s Denmark, are also excluded from the ‘monarchy’ regime type. 
Examples of ruling monarchies are Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates.
The second autocratic regime type is ideocracy. While it is true, in the words of Mosca and 
Pareto, that every political regime has some sort of ideological basis of legitimacy, ideocracies are 
Figure 1. Coding rules for categories of regimes.
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characterized by a totalitarian regime ideology. A totalitarian ideology promises its followers that 
it will pave the way to a utopian future (Friedrich and Brzezinski, 1965; Linz, 2000). There are 
three basic variants of regimes with a totalitarian ideology: communist, national-socialist/fascist 
and Islamist regimes.5 In the period studied, ideocratic regimes are equal to communist regimes.6 
A country is coded as a communist ideocracy if it (1) officially claims that it is a communist/social-
ist regime; and (2) if it is ruled by a Leninist party that proscribes opposition parties and exercises 
control over the society and economy.7 Examples of communist regimes are the Soviet Union, 
Yugoslavia and PR China.
The third regime type is military autocracy. Preconditions for coding a regime as a military 
autocracy are that (1) it cannot be coded as a monarchy or an ideocracy; and (2) there are no 
popular multi-party/multi-candidate elections for president. Rather, a political regime is coded 
as a military autocracy if the country is ruled by a junta of high-ranking military officers – in 
which civilian bureaucrats may play a role, or not – or by a high-ranking military officer who is 
selected by the military as the ruler.8 Examples of military regimes are Argentina (1976–1983) 
or Turkey (1980–1983).
The fourth autocratic regime type is personalist autocracy. Personalist autocracies are (almost) 
‘institutionless polities’ with no established rule of succession of power. (Brooker, 2008: 139; 
Jackson and Rosberg, 1982: 8). Preconditions for coding a regime as a personalist autocracy are 
that (1) it cannot be coded as a monarchy, an ideocracy, or a military autocracy; and (2) there are 
no (direct or indirect) popular multi-party/multi-candidate executive elections. In the subset of 
cases that fulfill these criteria, the defining feature that allows us to code a regime as personalist 
autocracy is that the personalist ruler has (almost) unlimited authority and hence there is no insti-
tutional non-violent option to topple him/her and select a new ruler. A case (in the above defined 
subset of cases) is always coded as a personalist regime if the ruler becomes president for life – 
such as in the case of Idi Amin in Uganda (1976) or Saparmurat Niyazov in Turkmenistan (1999). 
In these cases it is unimportant if legislative elections take place, as in Turkmenistan under Niyazov, 
or if they do not happen – as occurred, for instance, during the rule of Hissene Habre in Chad.
The fifth autocratic regime type is (non-ideocratic) one-party autocracy. Preconditions for cod-
ing a regime in this category are that (1) it cannot be coded as a monarchy, an ideocracy, a military 
autocracy, or a personalist autocracy; (2) there are no (direct or indirect) popular multi-party/multi-
candidate executive elections; and (3) the country is de jure and/or de facto a single party state. 
Examples of (non-ideocratic) one-party autocracies are Belarus (since 1991), Kenya (1982–1991) 
and Malawi (1964–1970).
The sixth autocratic regime type is electoral autocracy. Preconditions for coding a regime in this 
category are that it cannot be coded as one of the previous five autocratic regime types. In this 
subset of cases, a country is coded as an electoral autocracy if there are (direct or indirect) popular 
multi-party/multi-candidate executive elections and direct popular legislative elections. What dis-
tinguishes electoral autocracies from democracies is, first, that the elections are not free and fair; 
and/or, second, that the power of the ruler is not effectively constrained by the legislature.9 
Examples of electoral autocracies are Mexico (1945–1987) and currently Russia (since 2000).
While the great majority of cases can be classified mostly unambiguously, the categories of the 
classification presented above are in a strict sense not mutually exclusive (Sartori, 1970). Some auto-
cratic regimes are in fact hybrids of our ‘pure’ autocratic regime types. For instance, it might be argued 
that the Brazilian military dictatorship (1964–1985) fulfills all or, at least, most criteria for an electoral 
autocracy. However, if we apply rigorously the sequence of our coding rules presented above, and if 
we start with our initial question – who actually rules? – our coding becomes clear. In Brazil from 1964 
to 1985 it was the military, not a civilian party or a monarch, that ruled. In more detail, we find that the 
strongest indicator of military influence, namely ‘the ability of the officer corps to enforce term 
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limits’(against military strongmen) and ‘manage succession’ (Geddes et al., 2014: 153) apply to the 
Brazilian case. The top of the military negotiated every few years over planned presidential succes-
sions (Stepan, 1971) and the presidents of Brazil were chosen by the military and then approved by 
Congress, in order to give the impression of free elections having taken place.
In contrast, military-led regimes established by junior officer coups, as in Uganda (1971–1979) 
are classified as personalist autocracies and not as military regimes, because the military did not 
rule as an institution in these cases. For instance, during the rule of the military strongman Idi Amin 
in Uganda, no other officer had substantial influence on basic policy decisions. In many monar-
chies the monarch does not actually rule (e.g. Denmark). While these cases are clearly not ruling 
monarchies, there are cases on the borderline between a ruling and non-ruling monarch: the Thai 
monarch represents such an example. However, in our terms, the Thai monarch is not a ruling 
monarch because he, unlike his peers in the Gulf monarchies, neither rules the country himself nor 
does he manage the succession of the government.
Theory: regime legitimation, regime type and elite unity
An autocratic regime should be most durable if it has a narrow elite with shared values and 
beliefs that is strongly integrated into the regime. High elite unity and narrow elite differentia-
tion are the keys to a durable autocratic rule. Elite unity covers normative and interactive com-
ponents. The normative dimension is the extent to which members of the elite share values and 
beliefs; the interactive dimension ‘is the extent of inclusive channels and networks through 
which elite persons and groups obtain relatively assured access to key decision-making centers’ 
(Higley and Lengyel, 2000: 2). Elite differentiation is narrow when members are organization-
ally unified and have little autonomy from each other and the state. An autocratic regime should 
be most durable if it has a narrow elite with shared values and beliefs that is strongly integrated 
into the regime (Higley and Lengyel, 2000; Higley and Burton, 1997). An ideocratic elite pro-
vides the only elite configuration that ensures non-democratic durability. Different from Higley 
and Burton (2006), we argue that a monarchic elite is also unified and shares the goal of regime 
survival (Herb, 1999) (see Table 1).
Following their totalitarian regime ideology, ideocracies claim variously to fulfill the laws of 
nature, history or God (Backes and Kailitz, 2015; Bernholz, 2001; Piekalkiewicz and Penn, 1995). 
In an ‘ideocratic regime’, the ‘status and privileges of the ruling elite are justified with reference to 
a sacred heritage of which the elite is the current trustee and embodiment’ (Breslauer, 2002: 55; see 
also Best, 2012: 74). We expect communist ideocracies to be more durable than all kinds of non-
ideocratic party-regimes, for two main reasons.
Table 1. Configuration of ruling elites and regime types.
Elite unity
 Strong Weak
Elite 
differentiation
Wide Consensual elite 
(consolidated democracies)
Fragmented elite
(unconsolidated democracies, electoral 
autocracies)
 Narrow Ideocratic and monarchic elite Divided elite
(non-monarchic personalist, non-ideocratic 
party and military autocracies)
Based on Higley and Lengyel (2000: 3), with some modifications.
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First, the communist cadres are – more or less – united by the strong utopian vision of rule. Even 
if they do not personally believe in the totalitarian ideology, they act in public as if they do believe 
in it. The members of the ideocratic elite work together closely in ‘networks running through a 
highly centralized party’ (Higley and Lengyel, 2000: 7). The destiny of the members of the ideo-
cratic elite is closely tied to the destiny of the ideocratic regime. To become a member of the com-
munist elite, citizens are required to demonstrate commitment to the ideology and to the actual 
work of the party. If members of the ruling elite fail to do so, they risk being removed during 
‘purges’.10 Through this process a very strong, ideologically unified ruling elite is created, which 
practices social closure and self-recruitment of the ruling class, as well (Best, 2012; Djilas, 1957; 
Voslensky, 1984).
Mosca (1939) argues convincingly that according to the ‘law of intergenerational status conser-
vation’, which is very strong in Soviet-type regimes, every member of the ideocratic elite seems 
better off when the regime survives, but faces an uncertain future when a regime change occurs.11 
It is important to keep in mind that elite defections are not impossible in communist ideocracies 
(see the Soviet Union and Yugoslavia in the final period of these regimes); however, we maintain 
that they are just less likely than in non-ideocratic party autocracies.
Second, in communist ideocracies that come to power as the outcome of a revolution, the ideo-
cratic elite is united, at least initially, due to its common struggle against the previous regime. 
Levitsky and Way (2012: 869) state that during crisis ‘identities, norms, and organizational struc-
tures forged during periods of sustained violent, and ideologically-driven conflict are a critical 
source of [elite] cohesion’. We agree that this source of elite cohesion is very important at the 
beginning of revolutionary regimes. However, in later phases of the regime, more and more elite 
cadres do no more than pay lip service to the official ideology. This might apply in particular to 
communist ideocracies which were externally imposed on a country (e.g. GDR, Hungary and 
Poland) through the occupation by the Soviet Union. There (and elsewhere) the members of the 
ideocratic elite might become cynical about the communist ideology. However, they may still 
identify with the ideocratic regime because it provides them personal, social and professional ben-
efits. Hence, we hypothesize that, once established, the ‘law of intergenerational status conserva-
tion’ contributes to the survival of ideocracies regardless of whether its actual members still believe 
in the regime legitimation or not.
Similar to ideocracies, we hypothesize that elite unity should be strong in a ruling monarchy. 
The common justification of a monarch to rule is that she/he has a God-given, natural or at least 
established historical right to rule because of his or her descent, regardless of the political outcome 
of his or her rule (Lust-Okar and Jamal, 2002: 353; Richards and Waterbury, 1996). The power of 
a monarch relies – usually –upon the institution of an established aristocracy (e.g. Herb, 1999). For 
the sake of simplicity, we take the aristocracy in a monarchy as given.12 Aristocrats may fight each 
other to become the new monarch, but they can be expected to stand united against any attempt to 
abolish the huge privileges bestowed upon them by aristocratic birthright. In the absence of strong 
pressures from outside the aristocratic elite it is highly unlikely that the monarchic elite would 
voluntarily open the gates for a mass of new potential members of the regime elite.
If our theory is correct, communist ideocracies, all other things equal, should be considerably 
more durable than both non-ideocratic kinds of party-based autocratic regimes. In contrast to com-
munist ideocracies, in (non-ideocratic) one-party autocracies, with their vague political vision, the 
members of the party elite are more loosely tied with the fate of the political regime and – usually 
– much less integrated into the regime. The same is basically true for the ruling elite in electoral 
autocracies.
We also expect, all other things being equal, that ruling monarchies are much more durable than 
(non-monarchic) personalist regimes, because there are no significant parts of the monarchic elite 
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that wants to overcome the monarchy. In (non-monarchic) personalist autocracies, there is no insti-
tutionalized ruling class like the aristocracy: the ruling elite is fragmented and very loosely tied 
with the fate of the political regime. Because there are neither institutional nor traditional bounda-
ries to the ruler’s will, all members of the ruling elite in personalist regimes are continuously in 
danger of being excluded from the ruling elite. Under these circumstances, it is much more likely, 
in a personalist autocracy than in a monarchy, that members of the current regime elite defect to the 
opposition in a regime crisis. As soon as the personalist autocrat cannot provide enough booty, 
members of the elite will start to look for an alternative, which eventually might leave the personal-
ist autocrat alone in his/her fight to survive. We reject Geddes’ hypothesis that in personalist 
regimes patrimonial ruling elites can be expected voluntarily to ‘sink or swim’ with the personal 
autocrat (Geddes 1999: 130).
Probably even more so than personalist autocracies, military autocracies do lack a ‘recogniza-
bly valid source of authority’ (Beetham, 1991: 233). Whether or not the military is partially legiti-
mized by the constitution to govern (temporarily) in (defined) cases of emergency (e.g. Turkey), it 
always lacks legitimacy to rule in the long run because the military is simply not designed to 
govern a country permanently. The military elite knows this and usually acts accordingly. It has to 
justify its temporary rule with the presence of an internal or external threat to the country, and 
promise that once this threat is removed it – the military – will return authority to civilians.
In fact, a military autocracy is the only form of a political regime that might fall even when the 
ruling elite is united. The military as an institution might decide – without any struggles inside itself 
– to return to its barracks. In our view, many short-lived military regimes, such as those in Turkey or 
Honduras, did not fail in the strict sense of the word, but the military kept its promise to return to the 
barracks. Nevertheless, in those cases where some parts of the military, including the leaders of the 
coup, would prefer to stay in power – for instance, the junta in Peru after 1968 – the military govern-
ment is in permanent danger of being toppled by that faction of the military which wants to hand over 
the responsibilities of government to a civilian administration (Balmaseda, 1992; Geddes, 1999).
In this study, we focus on two comparisons.
1.  We compare party-based autocracies with a strong claim to legitimacy, namely ideocracies, 
with party-based autocracies with a – usually – weak claim to legitimacy.
2.  We compare personalist regimes with a strong claim to legitimacy, namely monarchies, 
with non-monarchist personalist regimes with a weak claim to legitimacy.
If our theory is correct, communist ideocracies should be much more durable than non- 
ideocratic one-party autocracies and electoral autocracies; and monarchies should be much more 
durable than non-monarchic personalist regimes.
Variables and operationalization
Dependent variable: durability
Our dependent variable, regime durability, is measured by the years a regime has persisted without 
interruption. Our data on regime survival are from the dataset compiled by Kailitz (2013, 2015).
Independent variable: autocratic regime type
To operationalize the regime categories as proxies for the type of regime legitimation, we created 
five dummy variables, with one-party autocracy serving as the reference category.
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Control variables
Economic wealth. There is a broad consensus in the literature that rich (materially wealthy) democ-
racies are unlikely to break down (Barro, 1991; Boix and Stokes, 2003; Przeworski et al., 2000). 
However, less is known about how the extent of wealth affects the durability of autocratic regime 
types. We could find only one article in the literature, by Sanhueza (1999), which tested the link 
between economic wealth and the durability of autocracies. Sanhueza (1999: 337) reported that 
‘rich autocracies do not show a lower hazard rate than less developed autocracies’. To measure 
material wealth we included the natural logarithm of GDP per capita and compiled the data from 
Maddison (2009).
Economic growth. Economic crises often foster political crises. This is largely true for both democ-
racies and autocracies (Gasiorowski, 1995; Svolik, 2013). Consequently, we expect that fast eco-
nomic decline in the form of low or negative growth fosters the breakdown of all autocratic regime 
types (Przeworski et al., 2000; Przeworski and Limongi, 1997). Economic growth was calculated 
on the basis of GDP data from Angus Maddison (2009). The formula used – well-known – is: GDPt 
– GDPt-1/(GDPt-1)×100.
Natural resources. In line with previous research, we argue that oil revenues or, more generally, 
non-tax revenues (i.e. revenues that the state gains through sources other than taxing its citizens) 
increase the durability of all types of political regimes. The mechanism linking rents and regime 
survival is that regimes with high non-tax revenues are less dependent upon taxation – and hence 
on their population (Morrison, 2009; Ross, 2001; Smith, 2004). For autocracies, selectorate theory 
further assumes that a dictator having oil or gas, or some other natural resource, at his disposal is 
able to raise enough money for themself and their winning coalition without the need of the active 
support of his citizens (Crespo Cuaresma et al., 2011). Based on the coding of Haber and Menaldo 
(2011) we classified 56 countries (see Appendix 3, available online at: http://ips.sagepub.com) as 
resource dependent (coded 1). These countries may depend on gas, oil, copper, diamonds, gold or 
other natural resources.
Ethnic fractionalization. We were unable to locate literature on any study that measured directly the 
relationship between ethnic fractionalization and autocratic regime survival. However, researchers 
have argued again and again that a democratic regime in particular will struggle to survive if it is 
made up of different nationalities (Bryce, 1912; Dahl, 1971; Muller, 1995; Horowitz, 1985; Linz, 
1978: 64; Rustow, 1970). Ethnic fractionalization might foster insurgency and civil war which, in 
turn, are strong risk factors for the survival of any political regime. Despite the fact that the empiri-
cal results on relationships between ethnic fractionalization and insurgency and civil war are mixed 
(Montalvo and Reynal-Querol, 2005; Easterly and Levine, 1997), we have decided to include this 
factor. To measure ethnic fractionalization we use data from Fearon and Laitin (2002; Fearon, 
2003).
Methodology
We have excluded all non-regime (e.g. foreign occupation and transition) and democratic epi-
sodes from our analyses and collected all possible data on autocratic regime survival for the 
period 1946 to 2009, which covers 3,597 observations. We have included all periods of autocratic 
regime apart from 37 countries with no data for at least one of the independent variables (see 
Appendix 1, available online at: http://ips.sagepub.com). With very few exceptions these 
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countries are small states with a population under 700,000. Thus our results do not apply to small 
states. The few countries with a population of more than 700,000 (e.g. East Germany) for which 
data were not available came from various regions, had various levels of development and distinct 
political cultures: it is therefore unlikely that missing data for these countries biases our results for 
autocratic regime survival (for a list of excluded cases please see Appendix 2, available online at: 
http://ips.sagepub.com).
We use our data for a three step research process. In the first step, we present some descriptive 
statistics on the mean duration rate of any of the six autocratic regime types. In the second step, we 
present two regression models. First we fit a logistic regression model to our data (Singer and 
Willett, 1993; Jenkins, 1995) (see Table 3, Model 1) in which we code country years during which 
a regime change occurs as 1 and all other years as 0 (zero). On the left hand side are our independ-
ent variables of interest – our five autocratic regime type dummies with one-party autocracies 
serving as the reference category – as well as the covariates (i.e. log GDP per capita, GDP growth, 
natural resources, log and ethnic fractionalization). To account for possible differences across time, 
we also include dummy variables for each decade in the observation period, with the 1940s serving 
as the reference category. To calculate this equation, we use ‘Clarify’, a program developed by 
Michael Tomz, Jason Wittenberg and Gary King (Tomz et al., 2003) which allows us to transform 
the log odds into probabilities.
The second type of model is a discrete time survival model (Rabe-Hesketh and Skrondal, 
2012: 749–796) (Table 3, Model 3). The approach is identical with the method Beck et al., 
(1998) have named ‘binary time series, cross section analysis’. Our dependent variable in the 
equation is the time until the breakdown of an autocracy occurs. This variable is right-censored 
(i.e. for some regimes breakdown could not be observed because the period of observation ended 
before an actual regime breakdown) and left-censored (for autocracies that came into being 
before 1946). The independent variables remain the same as in the previous model. We use a 
discrete time-survival model rather than a continuous time-survival model, because we include 
time-varying covariates.
In the third step, we run both models with two additional control variables – cooptation and 
repression, which are highly correlated with our regime dummies and which for repression is only 
available starting in the 1970s (see Table 3, Models 2 and 4). Despite the fact that Gandhi (2008: 
178) has only presented an empirical null finding, we hypothesize for the first indicator, coopta-
tion, that the presence of an elected parliament should enhance the durability of autocratic regimes. 
Like Gandhi we measure cooptation by the existence and significance of a legislature. The data for 
cooptation come from Cheibub et al. (2010). The variable is a three value ordinal scale, coded 0 if 
no legislature exists, including cases in which there is a constituent assembly without ordinary 
legislative powers; coded 1 if non-elective legislature exists (examples include legislators nomi-
nated by the effective executive, or on the basis of heredity or ascription); and coded 2 if elective 
legislators, or members of the lower house in a bicameral system, are selected by means of either 
direct or indirect popular election.
Finally, we include a control variable for state repression. Researchers have argued that repres-
sion is a main instrument for autocrats to stay in power (Escribà-Folch, 2013; Gerschewski, 2013; 
Levitsky and Way, 2006). However, there are very few empirical studies in the published literature 
that link state repression to autocratic regime survival. Results are mixed: while Bueno de Mesquita 
and Smith (2010) found that repression had no effect on the longevity of regimes, Escribà-Folch 
(2013) reported that restrictions on civil liberties are effective in deterring threats of upheaval. Our 
data for repression come from the Political Terror Scale (see Gibney et al., 2013), a five-item scale 
ranging from countries under a secure rule of law, coded 1, to countries where terror has expanded 
to the whole population, coded 5.
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Results
Between 1946 and 2009 a political regime lasted for 13.7 years on average. In line with our theory, 
communist ideocracies and ruling monarchies endured considerably longer – approximately 20 
years. With their united and narrow ideocratic elites, ideocracies are much more durable than other 
kinds of party-based autocracies, namely one-party autocracies and electoral autocracies that usu-
ally have fragmented or disunited elites. We find – also as expected – that monarchies with their 
united and narrow aristocratic elite are much more durable than non-monarchic personalist autoc-
racies. Military autocracies are the most volatile and hence susceptible to being overthrown. 
Enduring non-ideocratic party autocracies like Singapore are exceptions. The fact that extraordi-
nary economic growth has been delivered by the ruling party for a long time might explain the 
resilience of this country and therefore might account for the most deviant case in this category. 
Finally, our descriptive results, as listed in Table 2, indicate that electoral autocracies and personal-
ist autocracies, are slightly more durable than military-, or one party autocracies but by far not as 
resilient as communist ideocracies or ruling monarchies.
Our two main multivariate models (see Table 3, Models 1 and 3) mostly confirm the results 
from the descriptive statistics. This strengthens the robustness of the findings. Our results indicate 
that, compared to our reference category, one-party autocracies, communist ideocracies and mon-
archies survive much longer. Substantively, the probability transformations from Model 1 (see 
Table 4) indicate the following: a hypothetical country in the 1990s that is not dependent on natural 
resources and whose other independent variables are at the median has an annual likelihood to fall 
of less than five percent if it is a communist ideocracy or monarchy. This annual likelihood 
increases to over 13% if the regime is a one-party autocracy or a personalist autocracy and almost 
27% if the regime is a military autocracy.
Models 2 and 4 highlight that repression and cooptation strongly influence autocratic regime sur-
vival (i.e. both repression and cooptation decrease autocratic regime survival). While these results are 
not in line with most theories, they follow our argument that cooptation and repression entail a practi-
cal hazard and are risky strategies for autocratic rulers. In addition to cooptation and repression, the 
only other control variable we find to have an influence on autocratic regime survival is the country’s 
level of economic development: richer (material wealth) autocracies have a lower likelihood to break 
down. The three remaining control variables: economic growth, ethnic fractionalization and natural 
resources do not appear to influence autocracies’ likelihood of survival.
To assure the robustness of our findings from the main models, we ran several more specifica-
tions (not reported here). First, we added regional dummies to Models 1 and 3; more precisely, we 
included 15 regional dummy variables (the Caribbean, Central America, Central Asia, Eastern 
Asia, Eastern Europe, Micronesia, Middle Africa, Northern Africa, South America, Southern 
Africa, Southern Asia, South-East Asia, Southern Europe, Western Africa, and Western Asia, with 
Table 2. Results of the descriptive statistics.
Regime type Mean duration 
(years)
Standard 
deviation
Number of 
observations
Military autocracy 8.4 8.7 602
Communist ideocracy 20.3 14.4 697
One-party autocracy 8.4 6.5 479
Electoral autocracy 11.1 11.0 1575
Monarchy 21.6 16.1 675
Personalist autocracy 12.5 10.2 430
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Western Europe serving as the reference category). The inclusion of these dummy variables does 
not influence the likelihood of regime change for our regime type dummies. Second, we used a rare 
events logistic regression analysis (Tomz et al., 1999), choosing this additional statistical test 
because regime changes are relatively rare events. On average, regime changes happened roughly 
every 14 years in our period of investigation. In datasets such as ours, where non-events make up 
the greater part of the data, there is a danger that the effects of independent variables on the occur-
rence of an event may be seriously underestimated (King and Zeng, 2001). However, running this 
additional model essentially provided identical findings with our two main equations. This applies 
both for the sign and magnitude of the coefficients, as well as for the probability transformations. 
Finally, we ran a time series binary logistic regression model with random intercepts (Menard, 
Table 4. Probability that an autocratic regime falls at any given year.
Average probability of regime 
breakdown at any given year
Model 1 Model 2
Military Autocracy 26.7% 4.1%
Communist Ideocracy 4.9% 2.3%
Electoral Autocracy 16.2% 11.3%
Monarchy 3.6% 1.6%
Personalist Autocracy 13.9% 2.7%
One-party Autocracy 13.6% 10.0%
Table 3. Results of the logistic regression analyses (Models 1 and 2) and discrete time series model 
(Models 3 and 4).
Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4
Military autocracy 0.886*** (.244) –1.05** (.524) 0.794*** (.232) –0.981** (.492)
Communist ideocracy –1.15*** (.379) –1.67*** (.605) –1.15*** (.371) –1.57*** (.589)
Electoral autocracy 0.246 (.246) 0.382 (.360) 0.228 (.236) 0.367 (.341)
Monarchy –1.50*** (.440) –2.39*** (.843) –1.45*** (.433) –2.28*** (.824)
Personalist autocracy 0.029 (.303) –1.50 (.517) 0.026 (.292) –1.37** (.489)
Log GDP per capita –.371*** (.104) –.700*** (.152) –.342*** (.099) –.637*** (.143)
Economic growth –1.37 (1.15) –0.258 (1.63) –1.21 (1.09) –0.233 (1.53)
Resource resilient –0.028 (.151) 0.164 (.216) –0.022 (.144) 0.160 (0.205)
Ethnic fractionalization –0.024 (.268) –0.759 (.370) –0.023 (.255) –0.673* (0.345)
Cooptation –0.815*** (0.204) –0.752*** (0.193)
Repression 0.308*** (0.101) 0.275*** (.094)
1950s –0.737* (0.440) –0.643 (0.403)  
1960s –0.625 (0.423) –0.552 (0.383)  
1970s –0.926** (0.387) –0.056 (1.12) –0.828** (0.387) –0.038 (1.04)
1980s –1.27*** (0.437) –0.473 (1.11) –1.15*** (0.401) –0.426 (1.03)
1990s –0.689 (0.426) –0.055 (1.09) –0.625 (0.389) –0.062 (1.02)
2000s –1.42*** (0.464) –0.913 (1.11) –1.31*** (.431) –0.845 (1.03)
Constant –0.897 (.898) 3.68** (1.64) –7.06*** (0.851) –4.55*** (1.54)
Log likelihood –844.87 –401.98 –857.36 –408.92
N 3931 2197 3931 2197
Standard errors in parentheses, *p < 0.1, **p < 0.05, ***p < 0.01 (two tailed).
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2009). We ran this model with and without the regional dummy variables, and for both additional 
specifications we obtained results almost identical to those from our two main models.
Conclusion
In the first part of our article we proposed a theory of why autocracies with a ‘political formula’ 
that enhances elite unity – namely communist ideocracies and ruling monarchies – are more 
durable than all other types of autocracy. Next, we supported our theoretical claims with empir-
ical results. Our research helps us explain why communist ideocracies (e.g. China, Cuba or 
North Korea) and monarchies (e.g. Bahrain, Saudi Arabia) are, on average, so durable. An 
autocratic regime legitimation that fosters elite unity and narrows elite differentiation renders 
it difficult for opposition forces to overthrow the elites in power. Based on our theory and 
empirical evidence, we reject one of Geddes’ (1999: 129f) core assumptions: that in all party 
dictatorships those with a ‘vocation in politics are typically incorporated in the regime, lower-
ing the likelihood that such individuals will seek to overthrow it’ (Ezrow and Frantz, 2011: 198; 
see also Geddes, 1999: 129f.).
Our findings are at odds with Geddes’ hypothesis that, on average, party-based regimes last 
longest because authoritarian parties are ‘stabilizing factors in dictatorships’ (Wright and Escribà-
Folch, 2011). Rather, we argue that authoritarian parties are not the decisive stabilizing factor in 
autocracies, but that regime legitimation is more important for enhancing elite unity. In non-ideo-
cratic party regimes, parties or factions of a party consisting of individuals will always exist. These 
forces might periodically think that they are better off with a regime change. In particular, at the 
beginning of the regime and when the economic conditions are poor, forces within the regime 
might seek its overthrow. In line with Geddes (1999) and Hadenius and Teorell (2007), we find that 
military autocracies survive for much shorter periods than party autocracies. However, our argu-
ment differs considerably from that of Geddes. We argue that most military autocracies are the least 
durable autocracies because the military lacks a justification to rule permanently. Thus military 
autocracies might be short-lived because the ruling military elite is united (in its will to turn back 
power to civilian rulers).
One caveat regarding our research is that our focus is on autocratic regime survival and not on 
regime establishment. We suggest that it is very important to distinguish between conditions for the 
survival and establishment of autocratic political regimes. In the ‘age of democratization’ 
(Brownlee, 2007) and a ‘Western’ liberal hegemony in the international system (Levitsky and Way, 
2010), establishing a new communist ideocracy or a new ruling monarchy seems hardly possible. 
In addition, we argue here that ideocratic and monarchic regimes are durable; but, of course, this 
does not mean that they last forever. It seems that these kinds of regimes become vulnerable when 
popular pressures force the regime elite to modify the regime legitimation. To support this reason-
ing, Gill (2013: 12) argues that in the final years of the Soviet Union ‘the ideocratic regime’s legiti-
mation […] became subject to popular calibration in a way it never had in the past’. The effect of 
this change was to ‘dilute the ideocratic message and to render it more diffuse and ambiguous’ 
(Gill, 2013: 12). Therefore it seems that ruling monarchies and communist ideocracies are less 
vulnerable to elite-driven breakdowns than all other autocratic regime types; but, in the long run, 
they may well be taken down by mass-driven breakdowns. In fact this is exactly how, historically, 
most communist ideocracies and ruling monarchies have been overthrown.
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Notes
 1. The codebook is provided online as supplementary material to this article. We advise all readers that are 
interested in the coding rules to read the codebook. The data set is available upon request.
 2. However, in this article we do not test if the regime legitimation in autocracies really creates empirical 
legitimacy among the members of the ruling elite or the people. Rather we test if various types of autoc-
racies, which legitimize themselves differently, vary in their longevity of survival.
 3. In various publications, Schedler labels the regime type that we label here electoral autocracy, usually 
electoral authoritarianism. However, he uses both terms ‘electoral authoritarianism’ and ‘electoral autoc-
racy’ interchangeably (Schedler, 2006).
 4. Ideocracies are still better known in the literature as totalitarian regimes. However, the group of ideocra-
cies is broader than the group of totalitarian regimes and includes post-totalitarian regimes as defined by 
Linz and Stepan (1996).
 5. However, not all autocratic regime parties with an ideological foundation are totalitarian. For instance, 
Baathist parties in Iraq and Syria had some ideological foundation but did not follow a monist (totalitar-
ian) ideology.
 6. The only two examples of Islamist Ideocracies in our period of investigation were Afghanistan from 
1997 to 2000 and Iran from 1982 to 2009. We excluded these two cases from the analysis.
 7. For a similar definition see Dimitrov (2013: 3).
 8. For similar definitions see Ezrow and Frantz (2011: 166), Geddes (1999: 124) and Linz (2000: 172).
 9. This approach to distinguish democracies from electoral non-democracies is basically similar to Cheibub 
et al. (2010) and Svolik (2012).
10. The importance of ‘purges’ as a tool to establish a unified elite in communist ideocracies is outlined in 
Brzezinski (1956). However, sometimes such ‘purges’ get out of control when a ruler wants to monopo-
lize his own interpretation of the totalitarian regime ideology, like during the ‘Great Terror’ under Stalin 
and the ‘Cultural Revolution’ under Mao.
11. For the sake of simplicity, we picture the Nomenklatura as a closed elite. However, through temporary 
‘purges’ communist regimes ensure in their first decades of their existence that the regime’s elite is com-
mitted to the regime ideology and the current leaders.
12. However, the aristocracy in many monarchies shifted over time, with titles purchased and exchanged 
(e.g. England, Poland).
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